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THE NAME OF THE ROSE 
At a recent conference, Martha Minow presented a paper in 
which she discussed the significance of the fact that lawyers refer to 
cases by a shorthand: The last names of the litigants stand for the 
entire case and what it means for the lawyers. This shorthand oblit-
erates the human dimensions of the case, which, Minow argued, 
demonstrates something interesting about the way in which lawyers 
think about the law.t 
On hearing the paper presented, I noted that the shorthand 
Minow identified is not universal, and I wondered whether there 
might be some significant pattern beyond the one she was concerned 
with. What follows is a brief sketch of a completely informal inves-
tigation of how cases are named. 
First, there is Tarble, who has a whole Case named after him. 
There is also Rayburn, who is in the peculiar position that he lost 
his Case largely because, as it turned out, it wasn't his after all. 
Second, there are the cases which appear as Cases in the Supreme 
Court Reports: Passenger, License, Slaughterhouse, Civil Rights, 
Selective Draft Law, Employers' Liability, Second Employers' Liabil-
ity, and Penn Central Merger. Third, there are the cases that have 
received a shorthand designation that serves as an alternate unoffi-
cial name: the Insular cases, the Pentagon Papers case, the Steel 
Seizure case, the desegregation cases, the abortion cases, the school 
prayer cases. 
Consider some explanations for the second and third catego-
ries. What about law-and-economics? Calling something a Case 
serves the end of efficiency when several individual names of the 
litigants would create an excessively long citation in the standard 
"A v. B" form. This explanation is inadequate, however, because 
many cases with long names are reported as A v. B in the standard 
form, some single name cases combine only two cases, and many 
opinions are given the name of a single case even though several 
cases are decided together.2 
What about critical legal studies? Calling something a Case 
often appears to identify it as dealing in some way with aspects of 
I. For a casebook that insists on identifying the first name of everyone who is men· 
tioned in a case, see R. COVER, 0. FISS, & J. RESNIK, PROCEDIJRE (1988). 
2. If Brown v. Board of Education won't count, consider Miranda v. Arizona. 
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subordination, as in Slaughterhouse and Civil Rights.3 This practice 
might result from the Court's need to drive from its consciousness 
the fact that it is an instrument of power in a society riven with 
unjustified hierarchy. This explanation is inadequate, however, be-
cause it fails to explain why this particular subset of cases dealing 
with subordination is treated in this way, and because not every 
Case deals with subordination. 
What about doctrinal analysis? Calling something a Case 
might seem to identify it as both controversial and the foundation of 
significant later developments. This explanation is inadequate, 
however. It does not explain why this subset of controversial and 
foundational cases receives special treatment (consider Miranda). 
Also, not every Case is controversial and foundational. 
Finally, we might notice Roe v. Wade, in which no one appears 
on either side of the "versus." The identity of Roe is obliterated by 
the anonymous name proceeding, and, although there is a real per-
son named Henry Wade, he plainly is not the person/entity whose 
interests stand adverse to Roe's in the litigation. We might note 
here the impact that the film "The Silent Scream" had on anti-
choice propaganda, as an indication that obliterating identities 
through case names does not have any necessary political tilt. 
Doubtless there is more to be said about the practices of nam-
ing cases in various ways. Further research is desperately needed. 
Mark Tushnet4 
3. I would defend the proposition that this is true of Passenger and License as well, 
given the relation between the doctrinal points at issue in those cases and the issue of slavery. 
4. Professor of Law, Georgetown Law Center. 
